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Abstract
Fossil fuel is an essential input throughout all modern economies. The
reduced availability of this basic input to production, and the stabi-
lization of greenhouse gases concentration—which requires reductions
in fossil fuel energy use—would have a negative impact in GDP and
economic growth through cutbacks in energy use. However, this trade-
oﬀ between energy reduction and growth could be less severe if energy
conservation is raised by energy saving technologies. Here we study
this hypothesis and, in particular, the eﬀect of a tax over the energy
expenditure of ﬁrms as a way to promote investments in energy sav-
ing technologies. To do this we consider a general equilibrium model
with embodied and exogenous energy saving technological progress in
a vintage capital framework, where the scrapping rule is endogenous
and linear simpliﬁcations are eliminated.
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Fossil fuel—in particular petroleum and its reﬁnery products—is an essential
input throughout all modern economies. For example, in 1990, the United
States (US) consumed 84.16 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units)1of energy
from all sources; fossil fuels made up 71.98 quadrillion Btu, 85.5% of her
total energy consumption. Fifty years ago the US was self-suﬃcient in her
supply of petroleum; today she imports more than half of her petroleum and
consumes 25% of the world supply. In particular, Petroleum dominates the
transport sector of the energy consuming economy; this domination rose from
77% in 1949 to 97% in 1998. The increasing dependence on petroleum can
already be detected in 1972, when the daily consumption was approximately
2.6 x 106 m3 (cubic meters) (16.4 million bbr (barrels) )2 per day; by 1997,
this number rose to 3.0 x 106 m3 (18.6 million bbr) per day. Due to increasing
growth of industry over the past twenty-ﬁve years, the average annual growth
rate of US total petroleum consumption was 0.5%.
The importance of this input is also clear when we study the negative
impact in economic activity of a rise in oil prices. In fact, eight of the
nine recessions experienced by the US economy after the World War II were
preceded by an increase in the oil price (Boucekkine and Pommeret (2002);
see Brown and Yucel (2001) for a survey).
We can observe, as well, the high presence of fossil fuel in a world perspec-
tive (see Table 1). In 2000, the 41.3% of the world energy fuel was oil, and
63.7% together with natural gas. The Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) estimated a total world oil demand in 2000 around 76
million barrels per day; if world economic growth continues, crude oil demand
will also rise to 90.6 m b/d (million of barrels per day) in 2010 and 103.2 m
b/d in 2020, according to the OPEC’s World Energy Model (OWEM) refer-
ence case ﬁgures. The International Energy Agency (IEA) conﬁrmed these
predictions with 76.5 m b/d in 2001 (annual change of 0.4%), 76.9 m b/d in
2002 (annual change of 0.5%) and 78 m b/d in 2003 (annual change of 1.5%)
(IEA, Monthly Oil Market Report).
Despite of the importance of fossil fuel input we can point out two main
reasons to promote solid policies about reduction of the current fossil fuel
consumption.
First of all, fossil fuel—more precisely petroleum—is a resource subject to
exhaustion. The average annual growth rate of world consumption of reﬁned
11 Btu = 0,2520 calories (cal); 1 Btu/minute=0,0176 kilowatts (kW).
21 barrels (bbr) = 0,159 cubic meters (m3).
2Table 1: world energy fuel shares (per cent)
Energy 1998 2000 2010 2020
Oil 41.3 41.3 40.3 39.2
Gas 22.2 22.4 24.1 26.6
Solids 26.2 26.1 26.3 25.8
Hydro / Nuclear 10.4 10.3 9.3 8.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: OWEM Scenarios Report, March 2000
product between 1990 - 2001 was around 1.21%, while the average annual
growth rate of world proven crude oil reserves along the same period was
about 0.63% Furthermore, the OPEC estimated that OPEC’s oil reserves
are suﬃcient to last another 80 years at the current rate of production, while
non-OPEC oil producers’ reserves might last less than 20 years. However
this could be a too optimistic forecast; indeed, the IEA in 1998 predicted
that oil production would peak before 2015, so by 2020, demand will exceed
supply by 17 m b/d.
A second reason—but not less important—is the so called Greenhouse
Eﬀect. The natural presence of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere
is crucial for life in the surface of the Earth. Over the past century, human
activities—specially what are related with fossil fuel consumption—have been
releasing GHGs at a concentration unprecedented in geologic time (Ansu-
ategi and Escapa (2002)). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) observed an increase of GHGs’ concentration around 30% since pre-
industrial times. This upturn will eventually result in a global climate change
over the course of the next few decades.
Therefore, even though fossil fuel is an essential input, the reduced avail-
ability of this basic element in production and the stabilization of greenhouse
gases concentration would have a negative impact in economic growth, and
development, through cutbacks in energy use (Smulders and Nooij (2003)).
As a result we can ensure, a priori, a trade-oﬀ between energy reduction and
growth.
However, this trade-oﬀ becomes less severe if energy conservation is raised
by energy saving technologies. Carraro et al. (2003) observed that hypothe-
sis, since new technologies can fundamentally alter the extent and nature of
this trade-oﬀ. The eﬀect of public policies on the development and spread of
3new technologies is among one of the crucial determinants of the success or
failure of environmental management (see L¨ oschel (2002), for a survey, and
Jaﬀe et al. (2000)). Here we focus on the exhaustion problem of fossil fuel,
considering the energy saving technological progress as a way to oﬀset the
negative eﬀect of energy cutbacks. More precisely, a tax over the energy ex-
penditure of ﬁrms is evaluated in our model as a way to promote investments
in energy saving technologies.
In addition, other static comparative exercises—the eﬀect of a variation
in the disembodied technological progress, in the available energy supply and
in the embodied energy saving technological progress—are developed here.
There is a growing evidence that energy saving technological progress has
been signiﬁcant in the last two decades. Newell et al. (1999) studied whether
the increase in the energy cost in recent years induces energy savings inno-
vation in the US; they concluded that the induced innovation hypothesis is
very reasonable. Boucekkine and Pommeret (2002) studied the optimal pace
of capital accumulation at the ﬁrm level when technical progress is energy
saving. This model was based on one of the most accepted explanations of
the inverse relationship between oil prices and economic activity (see Brown
and Yucel (2001) for a survey), the so called supply side eﬀect: rising oil
prices are indicative of the reduced availability of basic inputs of productions.
Baily (1981) observed that this supply side eﬀect concerns the energy input
itself but also and specially, the capital input. In fact, Baily argued that
the productivity slowdown experienced by the US economy and the other
industrialized countries after the ﬁrst oil shock might well be due to a reduc-
tion in the utilization rate of capital, namely in the decrease of the eﬀective
stock of capital. The keywords for Baily are embodied technological change,
obsolescence of capital goods, and the energy cost. Considering these ideas,
Boucekkine and Pommeret (2002) developed a partial equilibrium model, at
the ﬁrm level, to study the supply side eﬀect depicted above in the presence
of embodied energy saving technological progress. They modelled obsoles-
cence by a vintage capital technology with an endogenous scrapping decision
and complementarity between capital and energy inputs 3.
Our model is an extension of Boucekkine and Pommeret’s (2002) con-
tribution, to the general equilibrium case. Here we consider an exogenous
technological progress embodied in the new capital goods, which are intro-
3In Baily’s set-up, obsolescence is simply modelled through a decreasing eﬀective output
as capital ages, and there is no explicit scrapping decision. Moreover, in this model
embodied technological progress makes capital good less productive over time.
4duced in the economy through a vintage technology with endogenous obso-
lescence (scrapping) rule. In a general equilibrium model, Boucekkine et al.
(1997) showed that the endogenous scrapping rule is constant with linear
utility. Later, Boucekkine et al. (1998) considered the case of non linear
utility function; they got an scrapping rule which converged non monotoni-
cally to its steady state value. The partial equilibrium model of Boucekkine
and Pommeret (2002) generates a constant scrapping rule. Considering the
general equilibrium case without linear simpliﬁcations, we assume a constant
scrapping rule in the long run (Terborgh-Smith result); however this regular-
ity may not be true along the transition. Eventually, this general equilibrium
framework is also very interesting because it allows us to study the global
eﬀect of environmental policies over the economy, and its relation with the
scarce energy supply and the expansion of energy saving technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model, the
behavior of consumer and the rules that depicts both the optimal investment
and the scrapping behavior of the ﬁrms. The balanced growth path (BGP)
is presented in section 3, where we show the necessary conditions for its
existence. Section 4 develops a static comparative analysis of our endogenous
variables, along the BGP deﬁned above. Finally, some concluding remarks
are considered in section 5.
2 The Model
Following Boucekkine, Germain, and Licandro (1997), we consider an econ-
omy where the population is constant. There is only one ﬁnal good (nu-
meraire good) which can be assigned to consumption or investment. The
ﬁnal good is produced in a competitive market by a constant return to scale
technology, which is deﬁned over a continuum of inputs in the interval [0;1].
One important diﬀerence with respect to the model by Boucekkine et al.
(1996) is that, in our model, inputs are produced by mean of a non-linear
technology. That technology is deﬁned over vintage capital 4. The input
market is supposed monopolistically competitive to allow for a concave proﬁt
function in inputs sector 5. Also we assume competitive labour market and
exogenous available energy supply.
4We do not consider labor in order to simplify the model. Indeed, if we introduce
labor in our model, it could be possible to normalize to unity the labor endowment of
individuals; so that the per-capita labor supply is equals to one for all t.
5We need to avoid corner solutions because we consider symmetric equilibrium.
5Household
Let us assume that the household considers the following standard inter-
temporal maximization problem with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)










subject to the budget constraint







0 r(z)dz = 0
(2)
with initial wealth a0, where c(t) is per-capita consumption, a(t) is per-capita
asset held by and the interest rate r(t) is taken as given for the household.
µ measures the constant relative risk aversion, and ½ is the time preference
parameter (it is assumed positive discount factor).





¡½t + ¸(t)(r(t)a(t) ¡ c(t))
then we have the transversality condition
lim
t!1
¸(t)a(t) = 0 (3)
and





The ﬁnal good is produced competitively by a representative ﬁrm solving









where the per-capita production y(t) is given by a constant elasticity of sub-









6deﬁned over a continuum of inputs yj(t) with j 2 [0;1]. It is assumed a







which comes from the standard monopolistic competition economy (Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977)) and they are taken as given by the ﬁnal good ﬁrm.
Input Firm
Producing in a monopolistically competitive market, the representative


























with the initial conditions i(t) given for all t · 0
ej(t) and Pe(t) are respectively the demand and the price of energy, which
are endogenous. Z is the expenditure energy tax deﬁned by the government6.
ij(t) is the investment of the representative input-j ﬁrm. The output and the
price for input j are respectively represented by yj(t) and pj(t). The price
of input j and the ﬁnal good production per-capita, y(t), are taken as given
by the monopoly. The equation (6) is our non-linear technology deﬁned over
vintage capital. The energy demand is obtained by the equation (7). Here
° > 0 represents the rate of energy saving technological progress and Tj(t) is
the age of the oldest operating machines or scrapping age. Considering mo-
nopolistic competition, the inverse demand function is given by the equation
(8).
Notice that new technology is more energy saving. Moreover it is im-
portant to observe that we assume complementarity between capital and
6It could be considered as a lump-sum tax.
7energy (Leontieﬀ technology). Certainly, each vintage ij(t) has an energy
requirement ij(t)e¡°t. This assumption is unfailing from numerous studies;
for instance Hudson and Jorgenson (1974), or Berndt and Wood (1975).





and the optimal life of machines of vintage t
Jj(t) = Tj(t + Jj(t)) (9)
Notice that Ti(t) = Ji(t + Ti(t))












































¡rzdz; ° > 0 (70)
J(t) = T(t + J(t)) (90)
i(t); t · 0; given





















where r(t) is given by (4).






























































where the left hand side is the discounted marginal productivity during the
whole lifetime of the capital acquired in t; 1 is the marginal purchase cost
at t, normalized to one; and the second term on the right hand side is the
discounted operation cost at t.
The optimal investment rule establishes that ﬁrms should invest at time
t until the discounted marginal productivity during the whole lifetime of the
capital acquired in t exactly compensates for both its discounted operation
cost and its marginal purchase cost at t.






= Pe(t)(1 + Z)e
¡°(t¡T(t)) (12)
9The optimal scrapping rule states that a machine should be scrapped as soon
as its marginal productivity (which is the same for any machine whatever its
age) no longer covers its operation cost (which rises with its age).
Here the marginal productivity is given by ®A(
R t
t¡T(t) i(z)dz)®¡1, and
(1 + Z)Pe(t)e¡°(t¡T(t)) represents the operation cost.
By the deﬁnition of capital, we also get
A®K(t)












Summarizing, the (decentralized) equilibrium of our economy is char-
acterized by the equations (2)–(4) (household side), the equations (6)–(9),
the optimal investment rule, the optimal scrapping rule, and the following
three additional equations to close the model: c(t) + i(t) = y(t), i(t) = ˙ a(t)
and e(t) = es(t), the equilibrium condition in the energy market. es(t) is the
available energy supply7; in our model it is assumed exogenous.
3 Balanced growth path
We consider a quite extended idea of long run equilibrium, balanced growth
path (BGP). This section deﬁnes our BGP, establishing later the necessary
conditions for such an equilibrium. Notice that “Owing to mathematical
complexities, the literature to date on vintage capital models hardly ventures
into an analysis of the properties of the system when it is oﬀ the golden-age
equilibrium path.” (P. K. Bardhan (1966) ). Moreover, the interior solution
of our problem, observed by Howard C. Petith (1976), “may not exist, or if
it exists may not be unique.” Up to now, we are facing the same diﬃculties.
In the following we consider that an interior solution exists for our economy.
Instead of assuming the uniqueness, we note that our result do not depend
on the uniqueness because the behavior of each BGP follows our analysis.
7The available energy supply is a ﬂow (exogenous) variable, for example petrol or any
other petroleum reﬁnery product to generate energy. Here we do not explicitly treat an
extraction sector.
103.1 Deﬁnition and necessary conditions
Let us deﬁne the BGP equilibrium as the situation where all endogenous
variables grow at constant rate, which may be zero and/or diﬀerent for each
variable. Then from (4) and along the BGP we get





t r(z)dz = e
¡r(¿¡t) (14)
where °c is the growth rate of consumption.
A particular BGP equilibrium is explored here, where the scrapping age
is constant in the long run
T(t) = J(t) = T(< 1) (15)
Observe that this deﬁnition does not imply a constant scrapping rule for
all t ¸ 0; we only assume a constant scrapping rule along the BGP. Such
an equilibrium (Terborgh-Smith result) is well known in economic literature8.
Let us consider our economy along the BGP. Diﬀerentiating (11) and
rearranging terms we obtain by (12)
(e




(°Pe¡r)J ¡ 1) =
r
(1 + Z)P e
e
°¡°Pet (16)
where °Pe and P e are respectively the growth rate and the level of the energy
prices. The left hand side (LHS) is constant for any t in the balanced growth
path, and the right hand side (RHS) is a function on t. So the equality holds
if and only if
° = °Pe (17)





















8For example P.K. Bardhan (1966) and (1969), H.C. Petith (1976), Boucekkine et al.
(1997) and (1998)
11Indeed, the growth rate of investment (°i) and capital stock (°K) are equal.
Moreover, by (12) and (17),
A®K(t)®¡1 = (1 + Z)Pe(t)e
¡°(t¡T)
= (1 + Z)Pee
°te
¡°(t¡T)
= (1 + Z)Pee
°T
(19)
Substituting (18) into (19) it yields
A®(Ke
°it)
®¡1 = (1 + Z)Pee
°T






From this equation we get the following result:
Proposition 1 Assuming 0 < ® < 1, the growth rates of investment and
capital stock are equals to zero along the balanced growth path .
Proof. It is easy to see that (20) holds if and only if ® = 1 and/or
°i = 0. Otherwise the LHS goes to 0 when time t goes to 1, but the RHS is
a nonzero constant. Since we consider a constant long run optimal scrapping
age, then we must have °i = 0.
In the case °i = 0 and 0 < ® < 1 we get






Notice that the case ® = 1 is not considered here because we want to
avoid linear simpliﬁcations.











°T ¡ 1) = es(t)
(21)
12On the other hand, from (12), we have along the BGP that
A®(iT)
®¡1
= (1 + Z)Pee
°te












From (16) and considering ° = °Pe then
e







(°¡r)J ¡ 1) (23)




Moreover by the constraint
y(t) = i(t) + c(t)
along the BGP we have that the growth rate of consumption is zero (°c = 0)
since °i = °y = 0, where °y is the growth rate of ﬁnal good output. Hence
r(t) = ½
Combining the above results we straightforwardly get the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 Along the balanced growth path, assuming 0 < ® < 1 and
° < ½,
1. the growth rate of investment, capital stock and ﬁnal good output are
equal to zero (°i = °y = °K = 0);
2. the interest rate is constant and equal to the discount factor (r(t) =
½ = r¤);
3. the growth rate of energy price (°Pe) is equal to the rate of energy saving
technological progress (°);
4. the scrapping age is constant ( T(t) = J(t) = T = T ¤);









where P e is the level of energy prices (i.e. Pe(t)¤ = P ee°t);
6. the available energy supply decreases in the constant rate ° (i.e. es(t)¤ =
ese¡°t).
3.2 Observations
There are three observations to do here. Firstly, our model has no growth in
the long run. This behavior is explained, on the one hand, by the assumption
of decreasing returns to scale in the intermediate good technology; and on the
other hand because here we get that both the scrapping age and the exoge-
nous energy saving technological progress are not strong enough to overcome
those decreasing returns. The reason is the following. Our framework con-
siders CRRA instantaneous utility function; as a consequence, the interest
rate is constant in the long run. Then, consistently with the Terborgh-Smith
result, the scrapping age is also constant along the BGP. Taking the optimal















it is straightforward that the discounted operation cost is constant because
the eﬀect of the energy saving technological progress (°) is oﬀset by the
decreasing available energy supply. Hence, as the marginal purchase cost
(1) is remaining constant, the investment has to be also constant along the
BGP.
This is not a standard result. In the case of neoclassical models, we
would have exogenous growth. For example, the models of Solow (1957) and
Ramsey (1928), with exogenous technological progress, described economies
which grew at the rate of both population growth and exogenous techno-
logical progress. Furthermore, considering linear technology, Boucekkine et
al. (1997) and (1998) developed two vintage capital models, with exogenous
technological progress, which generated growth and constant scrapping age
along the BGP. On the contrary, our problem assumes non linear technol-
ogy (® < 1). We get now that the (exogenous) energy saving technological
14progress oﬀsets the reduced availability of energy (non renewable resource)9;
however, it is not strong enough to overcome the decreasing returns to scale.
As a consequence, our economy has not growth along the BGP. This result is
consistent with the partial equilibrium model of Boucekkine and Pommeret
(2002), which depicts no growth along the BGP.
As a second observation notice that, in our model, the investment only
considers energy saving issues. If we include other features—for example,
R&D investments or abatement activities, taking into account pollution
problems—optimal investment, and consequently our economy, might de-
pict growth. Here we just focus on energy saving technological progress.
Finally, we have to point out the necessity to assume a long run available
energy supply es(t)¤ = ese¡°t to have BGP. Here the exogenous term is es, the
level of available energy supply. This structure of the energy market implies
that the energy prices increase at a constant rate °, which is consistent with
Boucekkine and Pommeret (2002). In their partial equilibrium model it is
assumed an exogenous evolution of energy prices Pe(t) = P ee¹t. If the growth
rate of energy prices (¹) is equal to the rate of energy saving technological
progress (°) then there exist a BGP; otherwise they got no BGP or unrealistic
equilibrium situations.
4 Static comparative
In this section we study the static comparative of the model. We consider the
eﬀect of modiﬁcations in the parameters of the endogenous variables along
the BGP. In our model this eﬀect is mainly known by the behavior of the
scrapping age and the investment. The performance of the scrapping age
is described by the optimal scrapping rule in the long run (equation (22)).










(°+½)T ¡ 1) (24)
9Indeed, taking the optimal investment rule in the long run, without energy saving








e¡½¿d¿ = Pe(t)(1 + Z)
it is easy to observe that, since the energy prices increases because of the reduced avail-
ability of energy, investment has to decrease for a constant scrapping age (0 < ® < 1).
15establishes the behavior of the investment.
As in the long run the optimal scrapping rule (equation (22)) and the
optimal investment rule (equation (24)) are functions of i¤;T and P e, we
need one more equation to describe completely the behavior of both the
scrapping age and the investment10. This third equation comes from the
equilibrium condition of the energy market. The energy demand is given by
the equation (21). As we assumed an exogenous long run available energy





°T ¡ 1) (25)
by equalizing energy demand and available energy supply. Therefore the
values of optimal investment, optimal scrapping age and level of energy prices
along the BGP are given by the equations (22), (24) and (25), which form
a static (simultaneous) system of non-linear equations, taken the values of
the parameters as given. Moreover, solving this system for diﬀerent values
of the parameters we can analyze the static comparative of our model. In
Appendix B we include the parametrization, results and ﬁgures of our static
comparative exercises.
4.1 Energy Expenditure Tax
Here we analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the energy tax level of our econ-
omy. In addition, considering such a static comparative exercise, we can
describe some of the diﬀerences between economies with unlike level of en-
ergy tax pressure. The purpose of this section is to describe the eﬀects of
an increase of Z over the optimal scrapping age (T), the optimal investment
(i¤) and the ﬁnal good output (y¤).
A ﬁrst approach is through a pure analytical method. From equation (25)
we can obtain an expression for the investment as function of the scrap-
ping age. Applying this to equation (22) (optimal scrapping rule in the long
run) and diﬀerentiating that expression with respect to Z, we get a function
F1(@T
@Z; @Pe
@Z ). To obtain the value of @T
@Z and @Pe
@Z we need a second equation
F2(@T
@Z; @Pe
@Z ). This expression comes from a the diﬀerentiation of the optimal
investment rule in the long run (equation (24)), after considerable manipu-
lations. Although this method allow us to obtain the analytical value of the
derivatives, we can not determine the sign of these for general values of the
10Observe that Pe (the level of energy prices) is an endogenous variable.
16parameters, neither imposing restrictions over some of them.
So, let us consider an alternative method to the technique described above.
This procedure is a combination between an analytical approach and the
numerical solution of the static system of non-linear equations given by the
expressions (22), (24) and (25).
By numerical methods—taking the empirical values of the parameters—
we can solve that system of non-linear equations for diﬀerent values of the
energy expenditure tax Z 2 (0;1). So, we can determine the sign of the
derivatives simply by plotting T, i¤ and P e against Z.
In particular, here we study the case of a quite high tax over the energy
expenditure of ﬁrms. Bailey (2002) observed that taxes in the UK comprised
81.5% of total fuel prices. Following such an example, and consistently with
the aim of the Kyoto Protocol, we assume a Z = 0:80. The results of the
simulation suggests that an increase in the energy expenditure tax boots the
optimal replacement age, and decreases both the optimal investment and the
level of energy prices.
The inverse relation between the level of energy prices and the energy
expenditure tax comes directly from the assumption of exogenous long run
available energy supply. Considering the economy in the long run, if we
increase that tax the available energy supply is not aﬀected (notice that the
economy is in the steady state) because it is exogenous and always decreasing
in time11. However the energy demand is reduced since energy is now more
expensive, for a ﬁxed level of production and scrapping age. As a result the
level of energy prices decreases.
About the other signs, we apply the negative relation between the level of
the energy prices and the energy expenditure tax in the expressions obtained
from the pure analytical method. In such a way, we can identify the positive
and negative eﬀects over the scrapping age and the investment in the long
run. In the following we analyze the behavior of the scrapping age along the
BGP.
4.1.1 Optimal Scrapping Age


























11Remember that our exogenous available energy supply is es(t)¤ = ese¡°t to have BGP.
The exogenous element of that supply is the level of available energy es
17Here it is possible to distinguish two opposite eﬀects of the energy expendi-
ture tax over the scrapping age.
Direct eﬀect: It is the eﬀect of a modiﬁcation in the energy tax over





















1+Z is always positive because 0 < ® < 1 and 0 < Z < 1.





1¡®)¡1 is positive. Then the direct eﬀect has a negative outcome over the
scrapping rule i.e. @T
@Z jPefixed < 0.
So, if the energy expenditure tax increases, the scrapping age is reduced
for a ﬁxed level of energy prices. The interpretation of this eﬀect is clear. If
the energy tax increases, the operation cost rises for a ﬁxed level of energy
prices. Consequently, ﬁrms decide to substitute earlier their equipment. We
can verify this explanation taking the scrapping and investment rule in the
long run. When the tax increases, ﬁrms can modify the decision about the
scrapping age and investment. The net result is given by substituting the
scrapping rule (equation (22)) into the investment rule (equation (24)). After
some manipulations it yields:


















When Z rises, ﬁrms compensate it by dropping the scrapping age for a ﬁxed
level of energy prices.
However, according to our simulation, this negative direct eﬀect is over-
come by an indirect eﬀect of the energy expenditure tax over the scrapping



















from equation (26). As @Pe
@Z is negative13, the indirect eﬀect is positive. When
the energy tax rises, the level of energy prices decreases. As a consequence,
12See Appendix A.










18the operation cost of machines is reduced. Then, ﬁrms want to scrap later
their equipment.
Summarizing, we can conclude the following. When the tax over the
energy expenditure of ﬁrms rises, the operation cost of machines increases.
Then, ﬁrms decide to replace earlier their equipment (direct eﬀect). How-
ever this eﬀect is overcome by the reduction in the level of energy prices which
is produced also by the increasing of the tax (indirect eﬀect). Hence, the
net eﬀect of an increase of the energy tax over the scrapping age is positive
@T
@Z > 0.
Therefore, our result gives a theoretical evidence that an increase of an
already high energy expenditure tax does not induce earlier replacement of
machines; this is because that tax also modiﬁes the level of energy prices.
4.1.2 Optimal Investment
The investment is another important decision for the ﬁrms, together with
the scrapping age of machines. Here we study how a tax over the energy
expenditure of ﬁrms aﬀects the investment choice i.e. @i¤
@Z
Diﬀerentiating the scrapping rule in the long run (equation (22)), and





























Here we can distinguish a direct eﬀect of the tax over the investment and
two indirect eﬀects, through the scrapping age and the level of energy
prices.
For a ﬁxed scrapping age and level of energy prices, we get the direct
eﬀect:
@i¤










This eﬀect is negative. If the tax increases, the operation cost of machines
rises too. Then, ﬁrms decide to invest less for a ﬁxed scrapping age and level
of energy prices14.
However, there are two additional indirect eﬀects.
Indirect eﬀect through the scrapping age: If the level of energy
prices is ﬁxed, the direct eﬀect of the energy tax over investment might be
14See the scrapping rule in the long run with Pe and T ﬁxed.
19reduced, compensated or overcome by the eﬀect of that tax through the












in equation (26). As in section 4.1 we showed that @T
@Z jPefixed < 0, it is clear
that this eﬀect is positive. When the energy tax increases, ﬁrms decide to
invest more because they replace earlier machines, for a ﬁxed level of energy
prices. This eﬀect is easily observed by the scrapping rule in the long run
(equation (22)).
Indirect eﬀect through the level of energy prices: The total eﬀect
of a variation in the energy expenditure tax is much more complicate when
we consider modiﬁcations in the level of energy prices. This indirect eﬀect is








As we showed in section 4.1, @Pe
@Z is negative. Then, this indirect eﬀect is
negative. When the energy tax increases, the level of energy prices decreases.
So, ﬁrms invest more.
Considering both indirect eﬀects, the net result is clear from the simula-
tion. The energy tax has a negative eﬀect over the investment through the
level of energy prices; the positive indirect eﬀect through the scrapping age
is not strong enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of the energy prices.
Then, here we can conclude that the sign of @i¤
@Z is negative. The energy
expenditure tax has a negative direct eﬀect over investment, because an
increase of the tax rises the operation cost. This direct eﬀect is reinforced
by the negative indirect eﬀect through the level of energy prices;
the additional indirect eﬀect through the scrapping age is not strong
enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of the energy prices.
4.1.3 Final Good Output
The static comparative of the ﬁnal good output is given directly from the




@Z is given by the equation of the ﬁnal good output in equilibrium
















From the previous sections, we know that @T
@Z > 0 and @i¤
@Z < 0. According to
our simulation, the eﬀect of increasing an already high energy expenditure tax
over the ﬁnal good output is negative; the decrease of the optimal investment
overcomes the later replacement of machines.
4.2 Disembodied Technological Progress
This section studies the eﬀect of an increase in the technological level of all
machines in our economy. Moreover we can apply this exercise to describe
economies involving diﬀerent levels of global technological progress. We have
to analyze an increase in the disembodied technological progress to do that.
The eﬀects over the scrapping age, the investment and the ﬁnal good out are
considered in the following. Here we apply a similar strategy to the method-
ology developed before.










































4.2.1 Optimal Scrapping Age



























In equation (29) we identify the direct eﬀect of an increase in the disem-


















21This eﬀect is positive (i.e. @T
@AjPefixed > 0)15. When A increases, the marginal
productivity of all machines rises too, and ﬁrms scrap later their machines.
So T increases.
However, the net eﬀect of A is a combination of the direct eﬀect described
above and the indirect eﬀect of A over T thought the level of energy prices


















This indirect eﬀect is negative because @Pe
@A > 0. When A rises, the marginal
productivity of all machines increases too. Therefore, ﬁrms replace later their
equipment. The older a machine the greater its energy requirements; then
the demand of energy rises for a ﬁxed level of eﬀective energy supply. As a
consecuence, the level of energy prices (P e) increases.
According to our parametrization, the net eﬀect of an increase in the
disembodied technological progress is to rise the replacement age. On the
one hand, the higher A the higher the marginal productivity of all machines;
therefore, ﬁrms scrap later their equipment (direct eﬀect). On the other
hand the level of energy prices increases, aﬀecting negatively the scrapping
age (indirect eﬀect). However, the former eﬀect is stronger than the direct
eﬀect. Then, ﬁrms decide to replace earlier their machines (i.e. @T
@A < 0).
4.2.2 Optimal Investment
The eﬀect of an increase in the disembodied technological progress over the
optimal investment is given by equation (27)16. We can distinguish a direct
eﬀect of A over the optimal investment:
@i¤







The higher A the higher marginal productivity of all machines. Consequently,
ﬁrms invest more (see investment rule in the long run (24)) for a given scrap-
ping age and level of energy prices.
15See appendix A.
16Observe that equation (28) directly gives us the @i
¤
@A as a function of @T
@A. However the
variation on T contains the variation of the level of energy prices. For that reason we use
equation (27), which separates both eﬀects.
22The direct eﬀect is reinforced by a decline in the scrapping age for a given













When A increases ﬁrms replace earlier their equipment, thus investment rises.













This eﬀect is negative because the higher A the higher the level of energy
prices. However, this eﬀect is not strong enough to oﬀset the positive eﬀects.
The net result is that an increase in the disembodied technological progress




4.2.3 Final Good Output
The ﬁnal good output is given by y¤ = A(i¤T)®. Taking logs and diﬀerenti-




















A priori, an increase in the disembodied technological progress rises the ﬁnal
good output since the marginal productivity of all machines grows (positive
direct eﬀect):
@y¤





















Hence, the net result of an increase in the disembodied technological progress
is a rise of the ﬁnal good output (
@y¤
@A > 0).
234.3 Available Energy Supply
In this section we study the eﬀect of an increase in the level of available (ex-
ogenous) energy supply over the replacement, the investment and the output
of our economy. This rising could be interpreted, for example, as the dis-
covering of new oil wells or the establishment of new trade agreements with
petroleum producer countries. Also we can apply this analysis to compare
economies with diﬀerent levels of available energy.








































4.3.1 Optimal Scrapping Age
The eﬀect of an increase in the level of available energy supply over the










































This is a negative eﬀect17. It seems a strange result, because we expected
an increase in the scrapping age due to the higher level of available energy
supply. However, the reason is that we impose that the demand of energy
has to be equal to the supply for each period. If we ﬁx the level of energy
prices, ﬁrms have to replace earlier their equipment (take equation (7’) in
the long run i.e. energy demand). For that reason we have to point out the




















24As the available energy supply increases, the level of energy prices decreases
(i.e. @Pe
@es < 0). Then the indirect eﬀect is negative.
Finally, given our parameters, the net eﬀect is positive as we expected.
A rise in the available energy supply reduces the level of energy prices (i.e.
@T
@es > 0) . Therefore, ﬁrms decide to replace later their equipment.
4.3.2 Optimal Investment
Equation (31) describes the eﬀect of an increase in the available energy sup-
ply over the optimal investment. In this case such an increase aﬀects the
optimal investment through two indirect eﬀects.
If we ﬁx the level of energy prices, the rise in the available energy supply
reduces the optimal investment because the scrapping age is higher ( @T
@es > 0).
















As we have shown in the previous section, the higher available energy supply
the higher scrapping age. Then, for a ﬁxed level of energy prices, when this
supply increases, ﬁrms invest less because they decide to replace later their
equipment.
However, there is an additional eﬀect coming from the variation of the












When the available energy supply increases, the level of energy prices de-
creases for a ﬁxed scrapping age. As a consequence, ﬁrms invest more be-
cause the operation cost it is reduced.
According to our parameters, the net eﬀect is positive ( @i¤
@es > 0). When
the available energy supply increases, the eﬀect coming from a lower level
of energy prices (indirect eﬀect through the level of energy prices)
overcomes the consequence of a higher replacement age (indirect eﬀect
through the scrapping age). Hence, ﬁrms invest more.
254.3.3 Final Good Output
The eﬀect over the ﬁnal good output straightforwardly comes from the be-
havior of the optimal scrapping age and the optimal investment. As in the

















As both eﬀect are positive, the higher available energy supply the higher ﬁnal
good output.
4.4 Embodied Technological Progress
The eﬀect of an increase in the energy saving technological progress, incorpo-
rated in new equipment, is analyzed here. As in the previous sections, we can
apply this static comparative exercise to compare economies with diﬀerent
rates of energy saving technological progress.
Taking logs and diﬀerentiating equations (22) and (25) with respect to













































we characterize this long run dynamic.
4.4.1 Optimal Scrapping Age
The eﬀect of such a technological progress over the replacement decision of























































26Comparing with the initial rate of energy saving technological progress, the
higher ° the less energy requirements of new equipment. Then, ﬁrms decide
to replace earlier their equipment for a ﬁxed level of energy prices (see equa-
tion (36)).
However the replacement decision is also determined by the variation of
the level of energy prices @Pe
@° < 0. When ° increases, new machines need less
energy than before. Then, for a given scrapping age, the demand of energy
decreases. As a consequence, the level of energy prices decreases too. This



















This is a positive eﬀect18. Since the level of energy prices decreases, the op-
eration cost falls and ﬁrms decide to replace later their equipment.
The combination of both eﬀects gives us the net outcome of ° over the
scrapping age. Given our parametrization, the eﬀect of a decrease on the level
of energy prices (positive indirect eﬀect) is not strong enough to overcome
the negative direct eﬀect. Hence, the higher rate of (embodied) energy
saving technological progress the lower replacement age (@T
@° < 0).
4.4.2 Optimal Investment
Equation (34) gives us the behavior of the optimal investment (i¤) in the
face of a variation in the embodied energy saving technological progress (°).
Here we can distinguish a direct eﬀect of ° over i¤:
@i¤





For a ﬁxed scrapping age and level of energy prices, when the rate of em-
bodied energy saving technological progress increases, ﬁrms have incentives
to invest more because the new equipment needs less energy to work. This is
clear from equation (24) (optimal investment rule in the long run). Consid-
ering T and P e unchanged, it is straightforward that the RHS rises when °
increases19.To maintain the equality, investment has to increases to rise the










19Diﬀerentiating RHS with respect to °, for T and Pe ﬁxed
27LHS.
However, two positive indirect eﬀects overcome the negative direct ef-
fect. A variation in ° modiﬁes the replacement age (@T
@° < 0). This indirect













The higher ° the lower T (see the previous section). Then, ﬁrms decide to
invest more.
This eﬀect is reinforced by a second positive indirect eﬀect through










When the rate ° rises, the level of energy prices decreases. As a consequence,
the operation cost of machines falls, inducing ﬁrms to invest more.
Summarizing, an increase in the rate of embodied energy saving techno-
logical progress boosts optimal investment (@I¤
@° > 0).
4.4.3 Final Good Output
















From the previous sections we know that @i¤
@° > 0 and @T
@° < 0. According
to our parametrization, the net eﬀect of an increase in the rate of embodied
technological progress is negative (i.e.
@y¤
@° < 0). The negative eﬀect of the
replacement age overcomes the positive eﬀect of the optimal investment. As
a consequence, the level of ﬁnal good output falls.
This is an expected result. Boucekkine et al. (1997) and (1998) got a de-
creasing level of ﬁnal good output after a positive shock on the (exogenous)
embodied technological progress. In their models, the economy continued to
grow; however, the levels—series without the trend—fell20. Moreover, as we
20See the second observation of Section 3.2
28noted in the second observation of Section 3.2, this fall could be compensated
by including additional elements in the investment. Indeed, if the increase
in the embodied technological progress (°) go with a rise in the disembodied
technological progress (A), the ﬁnal good output boosts21.
Observe that, in any case, a fall in the level of ﬁnal good output does not
necessary implies a decrease in welfare. Gains in welfare could be ﬁnding
during the transition to the long run equilibrium.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied the hypothesis proposed in the introduction. Even
though fossil fuel is an essential input throughout all modern economies, both
the reduced availability of this basic input and the stabilization of greenhouse
gases, require reductions in fossil fuel energy use. This cutback generates a
trade-oﬀ between energy reduction and growth. However, if energy conser-
vation is raised by energy saving technologies, this trade-oﬀ might be less
severe. In particular, we analyzed an important feature of this hypothesis;
the employment of a tax over the energy expenditure of ﬁrms as way to
promote investments in energy saving technologies. A general equilibrium
model, with embodied exogenous energy saving technological progress and
vintage capital technology, has been used to perform this study. In this model
we also considered endogenous scrapping rule, without linear simpliﬁcations.
We focused our analysis on the long run consequences of modiﬁcations
in a tax over the energy expenditure of ﬁrms. In addition, we studied other
static comparative exercises; the eﬀect of a variation in the disembodied
technological progress, in the available energy supply and in the embodied
energy saving technological progress. The methodology developed here was
a combination of numerical and analytical methods.
We found that our model is very rich to capture the diﬀerent elements
that aﬀect the long run behavior of our economy. In particular, we point
out the usually forgotten subject of technology replacement, which plays
an important role in issues about energy saving technological change. One
important consequence of considering such a replacement eﬀect is that an
increase of an already high energy expenditure tax does not induce earlier
replacement of machines; this is because that tax also modiﬁes the level of
energy prices. In contrast, policies to improve energy saving technological
21See Appendix B.
29progress induce lower scrapping age.
Obviously, our analysis has some limitations. The main restriction here
is the assumption of exogenous energy saving technological progress. It is
clear that a tax over the energy expenditure of ﬁrms has eﬀects over such a
technological progress. Moreover, our model performs no growth in the long
run; this is because both the exogenous energy saving technological progress
and the constant scrapping age, do not overcome the decreasing returns to
scale. Considering endogenous technological progress, sustainable growth
might be generated. So, an important extension of our model could be the
inclusion of endogenous energy saving technological progress. Some studies
in the literature concerning to the importance of an endogenous technological
progress in this kind of models are, for example, Carraro, Gerlagh and van der
Zwaan (2003) or Buonnano, Carraro and Galeotti (2003). As we considered
a general equilibrium model, a good possibility to implement this idea is
through an R&D sector (see L¨ oschel (2002) for a survey about technological
change in economic models of environmental policy).
A second interesting extension could be the inclusion of a petroleum reﬁn-
ery sector, because we assumed exogenous available energy supply. Since the
energy supply will be endogenous, the behavior of the energy prices would
be more realistic, specially along the short run.
In general, both extensions would particularly improve the performance
of our model to describe the transition to the BGP. Then, a welfare analysis
could be developing in order to measure costs associated to the short run
dynamic.
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32Appendix A












Proof. The term inside the brackets is equal to
(e°T ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®) ¡ °Te°T(1 ¡ ®) + °T(e°T ¡ 1)
T(e°T ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
If 0 < ® < 1, ° > 0 and T > 0 then the denominator is greater than
zero22.
About the numerator, rearranging terms we obtain that it is equal to
e
°T(1 ¡ ® + ®°T) ¡ (1 ¡ ® + T°)
If we rename °T = x, the numerator is a function f(x) = ex(1 ¡ ® + ®x) ¡
(1 ¡ ® + x). It is easy to see that f(0) = 0 and f0(x) > 0 because x > 0.
Then the numerator is greater than zero.














In this paper we write a program for Gauss23 to solve the static system of
non-linear equations given by the expressions (22), (24) and (25). Its struc-
ture is simple. First, we assign values to the parameters of our model from
the economic literature to get an optimal scrapping age and ratio optimal in-
vestment/gdp around, respectively, 16 years and 16%. As we want to analyze
the eﬀect of a variation in some exogenous variables, we generate a sequence
of them. After, we solve the static system of non-linear equations by a stan-
dard Newton-Raphson algorithm. Finally, we plot the level of energy prices
22Observation: if ° > 0, ½ > 0 and T > 0 then e°T > 1 and e½T > 1
23GAUSS for Windows NT/95 Version 3.2.32
33(Pe), optimal scrapping age (T), optimal investment (i¤), ﬁnal good output
(y¤) and ratio i¤
y¤ against the diﬀerent values of exogenous variables.
Table 2: Parametrization
Parameter ∆Z ∆A ∆es ∆°
A 15 [14,15] 15 15
® 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
½ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
° 6% 6% 6% 6%
ee 400 400 [400,410] 400
Z [0.8,0.9] 0.8 0.8 0.8
Table 3: Results
Parameter ∆Z ∆A ∆es ∆° ∆°∆A
P e # " # # "
T " # " # #
i¤ # " " " "
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